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# Siberia, or the importance of territory for national power

*This chapter features story parts and information pieces that integrate into a whole in order to make a preliminary case for the importance of territory and its development. The text includes the following considerations: (1) Aspects of the early French colonisation in Canada are briefly explored; (2) Empirical testing shows that the correlation between land area and power perception is weak; (3) How some qualitative attributes of territory might be assessed; (4) Population growth for 2008 years (1–2009) shows that populations in low-density areas grew five times as much as in high-density areas; (5) Climate change (and infectious diseases) played a role in the downfall of Rome; (6) Owing (partially) to the West's sanctions, Russia is now the world's largest wheat exporter; (7) Siberia can save Russia from becoming like Poland.*

## The history of a few acres of snow…

In several of his books as well as in many letters, Voltaire (1694–1778), who was a French Enlightenment writer as well as a historian and a philosopher Voltai, opposed the French colonisation of Canada (New France) as one lacking economic value and strategic importance.[1] In his view, the British had taken the best land in the more temperate areas (the Thirteen Colonies that formed today's USA), whereas French settlers had to contend with an unproductive and useless frozen wasteland. In his *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations*,[2] published in 1754, Voltaire wrote: "Canada [is] a country covered with snows and ices eight months of the year, inhabited by barbarians, bears and beavers".[3] His characterisation of Canada was simplistic and illinformed. His portrayal of a colony based on fur trade was already a century out-of-date even at his time. One may excuse Voltaire by pointing out that Europeans at that time did not know much about those areas, also with regard

[1] The focus here on Voltaire aims to polemically illustrate the more general French attitude of neglect towards France's colonies in North America at that time.

[2] Voltaire, *An Essay on Universal History, the Manners, and Spirit of Nations*, J. Nourse, London 1959.

[3] P. Misencik, *George Washington and the Half-King Chief Tanacharison: An Alliance That Began the French and Indian War*, McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, Jefferson 2014, p. 33.

to the Midwest. In today's view his shortsightedness concerning the economic and developmental potential of the territory is, of course, striking. In today's view, one can say that a few thousand additional French settlers in Canada would have changed nothing in France. It only needs to be pointed out that the France of the 18th century had experienced sixteen famines. The Great Famine of 1709 caused 600,000 deaths, which was 3% of the population of France at the time. In comparison, the French population of Canada was 55,000 in 1754. Here, a few thousand additional French settlers could have made a huge difference. The French settlers in Canada had a galloping birthrate. Living conditions were far healthier than in France. The colony experienced a reduced infant mortality rate and a lower spread of disease. Due to a larger population dispersion, Canada was free of fatal epidemics (influenza, smallpox, typhus) until the end of the 17th century. Young couples had greater opportunities to settle and enjoy easier living conditions: the fishing was often good, the land was fertile, the woods were rich in game. This contributed to rapid population growth by favouring large families.[4]

Voltaire had a point on defensibility. Compared to the 55,000 French settlers in Canada, the Britain's Thirteen Colonies had a population of 1.2 million in 1754.[5] Thus, Voltaire's point was that "an effective defense of Canada by France requires an extraordinarily large commitment of resources in comparison to the scant economic value in return".[6] This defence burden would have dropped dramatically with a greater population at place. The beginnings of the French settlement in North America were difficult. The lack of interest by France much of the time did not help at all. In the Treaty of Paris (1763), France lost its colonial possessions in Canada (except for Saint-Pierre and Miquelon).[7]

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[4] Most of this paragraph is translated by myself in a slightly paraphrased form from the French Wikipedia entry «*Quelques arpents de neige*», which uses Danielle Gauvreau's cited article as its source. I used diverse public sources for much of the information in this section in general – D. Gauvreau, Vingt ans d'études sur la population pendant le régime français: bilan et perspectives, in: S. Dépatie, C. Desbarats, D. Gauvreau, M. Lalancette, T. Wien, *Vingt ans apres, Habitants et marchands: Lectures de l'histoire des XVIIe et XVIIIe siecles canadiens*, McGillQueen's University Press, Montreal & Kingston 1998, pp. 31–51.

[5] J. Jackowetz, History: Settlement and Political Division – New France, *BScene* 2019, October 8 [online], https://www.bscene.ca/history-settlement-and-political-division-new-france/ [accessed: 24.02.2022].

[6] P. Misencik, op. cit., p. 34.

[7] Acadia had been a part of Canada (New France) which consisted of today's Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, part of Québec, and parts of the present-day American state of Maine. The British conquered Acadia in 1713. From 1755 to 1764, the British committed genocide by expelling 11,500 French Acadians from lands that they had farmed for a century. Those Acadians were deported to the Thirteen Colonies (today's USA) as well as to the UK and France. At least 5,000 Acadians died of disease, starvation, or in shipwreck during this procedure. Moreover, the British burned the houses of the Acadians. 2,600 Acadians managed to elude capture.

## Testing territory empirically as a component of national power

In the research, I empirically tested territory twice, as a component of national power, by using available surveys of national power.[8] The 2011 article discusses space and its importance in a broader theoretical geopolitical framework than this chapter here does. Yet, this article also empirically tests spatial variables and their correlation to power perception. As for power perception, I used the 1998 survey by Jean-Yves Caro.[9] The result is a correlation coefficient ($r$) of 0.258 regarding surface area (logarithm) and power perception scores. The correlation coefficient has to be squared ($r^2$) in order for us to see what proportion of the variance two variables have in common. In this case, $r^2$ amounts to 6.7%. If for a strong correlation one wants to achieve 50% or above, then this is a lamentably weak correlation. In other words, surface area as a single determinant of national power is close to useless.

The 2016 article, in turn, focuses on empirically testing 23 single indicators and 45 composite indexes to see how well these selected single indicators and composite indexes perform in relation to one another in estimating national power quantitatively. This represented the first comprehensive and systematic testing of replicable power indexes to observe and compare actual performance in quantitatively estimating national power. Unless (preliminary) criteria are created to determine and quantify the performance of power indexes themselves in quantitatively estimating national power, I argue that power measurement is bound to remain at the present level of an amateur discipline.

The 2016 article uses two measures of performance. The secondary performance measure does the same as in the 2011 article, using the same 1998 perception survey by Jean-Yves Caro. The difference is that instead of $r$ or $r^2$, it uses an adjusted $r^2$, which is a more sophisticated measure, taking into account the number of predictor variables and observations. In any case, the result is an adjusted $r^2$ of 4.1% for land area, which more often than not roughly

[8] K. Hwang, Power in Alexander Supan's guidelines to general political geography (1918/1920), *Przegląd Geopolityczny* 2011, No. 3, pp. 23–44; K. Höhn, The deplorable performance of replicable National Power Indexes, *Potęgometria* 2016, No. 3, pp. 9–34.

[9] Caro conducted the survey in the first semester of 1998 at the Institute of Higher Studies for National Defence [Fr. *Institut des hautes études de défense nationale* – IHEDN], which is a French public institution for training military and civilian public servants in matters of defence. 214 students agreed to participate in the survey. The interviewees were asked to assign scores ranging from 1 to 15 for the power of 40 selected countries. Here is the complete list of countries along with their respective power perception scores: United States 14.38, China 12.11, Japan 12.00, Germany 11.82, France 11.61, the United Kingdom 11.34, Russia 11.32, India 10.24, Israel 9.92, Canada 9.76, Australia 8.65, Spain 8.44, Brazil 8.41, South Africa 8.25, Saudi Arabia 8.12, Iran 7.8, Turkey 7.8, Sweden 7.69, Pakistan 7.38, Argentina 7.18, Indonesia 7.12, Mexico 7.10, Iraq 7.09, Singapore 6.93, Ukraine 6.87, Egypt 6.81, Syria 6.75, Chile 6.23, Poland 5.86, Malaysia 5.78, Morocco 5.76, Nigeria 5.47, Libya 5.37, Algeria 5.27, Colombia 4.76, Uruguay 4.43, Lebanon 4.30, Sudan 3.32, Yemen 3.29, Zambia 2.50 – J.-Y. Caro, Les schèmes de perception de la puissance, *Les Champs de Mars* 2000, (2e semestre), pp. 97–125.

corresponds to surface area. In other words, land area as a single determinant of national power is useless.

The primary performance measure focuses solely on cases where a country with a smaller population is perceived as more powerful than a country with a bigger population. Mirosław Sułek conducted 35 surveys for the time period of 2003–2015, which are used in addition to Caro's 1998 survey.[10] The results of the primary performance measure are even more brutal. The scale of the primary performance measure reached from +100.0% to –100.0%. Land area performed –13.6%, i.e., if anything, this could lead to the conclusion that it is better for the national power of a country to have less territory.

## Reflecting on the issue of territory

If Voltaire were still alive, he would feel elated to know how the correlation coefficients and primary performance measure of the previous section completely vindicate his view that whatever constitutes national power derives from other considerations than territory *per se*; owning territory can be a burden. That territory *per se* does not constitute national power, which is also clear from the many uninhabited planets in this Universe. However, to completely abandon the idea that territory on this planet has significance for national power destroys the legitimacy of geopolitics altogether. Geopolitics has been all about space and location in relation to power. For the moment, there appears no other way out of this trap other than by frontally assaulting the correlation coefficient as a concept. Either that or one has to construct lengthy and complicated ways to add quality assessments to territory:

1. For example, whereas the 2011 article showed $r = 0.258$ for surface area and power perception, the same article showed $r = 0.388$ for agricultural land and power perception. This is a slight improvement. Hence, frozen wastelands count less with regard to national power than already developed agricultural lands. Still, there are also unused lands that could be readily converted to agricultural lands if the demand and sufficient population were there.

[10] The 2003–2015 surveys featured 39–40 selected countries each. But instead of assigning a score, students were asked to rank the countries. Though the respondents came from different classes, most of them were students of international relations or a related subject. The interviewees included anyone from first-year students to master-degree students as well as military attachés taking specific courses. The classes also varied in size from 11 to 125. Out of the 35 surveys that Sułek carried out in the period of 2003–2015, 33 were conducted in Poland, 1 in Turkey, and 1 in Slovenia. What is more, power perceptions are consistent and reliable across cultures and political systems – N.Z. Alcock, A.G. Newcombe, The perception of national power, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1970, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 335–343; C. Doran, K. Hill, K.R. Mladenka, K. Wakata, Perceptions of national power and threat: Japan, Finland, and the United States, *International Journal of Group Tensions* 1974, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 431–454.

2. Then, there is the issue of natural resources. This can massively add to the value of holding territory. To some extent, it can be quantified, even as the market values of different natural resources change over time.
3. Last but not least, there is the military dimension, which is obvious particularly to small nations such as Israel; if they do not stay constantly alert, they could be overrun before war is declared. However, factors such as mountain ranges or whether a country is an island, and so many other factors, come into play as well, so it may not be impossible (but, rather, grotesquely difficult) to properly quantify it all.

## Population growth and density in the period of 1–2009

The reason for which the correlation coefficient does not value territory is the undeniable existence of small powerful countries today and throughout history. If one looks at and compares Singapore and Mongolia, it is clear which country today ranks higher in terms of national power. Israel has already been mentioned; it is ranked in the Caro survey (1998) with the score of 9.92 when compared to Saudi Arabia's 8.12, Iran's 7.8, and Turkey's 7.8. What else is there to say?

The resuscitation of the importance of territory comes by taking a long view. In this case, the view is on two thousand years of demographic change.[11] The hypothesis is simple: if territory (space) *per se* is irrelevant, then population growth for the last two thousand years in regions with low population density in the year 1 should have been more or less the same (not exceeding an arbitrary factor of two), as in regions with high population density in the year 1. Low and high population density are defined by the world average in the year 1 as the dividing line.

Table 1 below uses the Maddison data for populations in the years 1 and 2009. Since there are no population estimates for all regions (today's countries) in the year 1, some areas contain more than one region. Population densities for the entire land mass of the globe (minus Antarctica) are quantified. This provides data for 50 defined areas, as presented in the table.

The table disproves the aforementioned arbitrary hypothesis. The population in high-density regions grew 18 times from the year 1 to the year 2009. The population in low-density regions grew 84 times from the year 1 to the year 2009. This represents a factor of five, meaning that population in low-density regions grew five times as much as population in high-density regions. Territory is, therefore, relevant to long-term population growth.

[11] This is possible due to the work of economic historian Angus Maddison (1926–2010). He constructed statistics on population and GDP (PPP) back to year 1 for many countries and continental areas.

**Table 1. Population growth and density 1−2009**

| | | $P_1$ | $P_{2009}$ | T | $D_1$ | $D_{2009}$ | Q |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Italy | 8,000 | 58,126 | 301 | 26.5 | 192.9 | 7 |
| 2 | India | 75,000 | 1,156,898 | 3,287 | 22.8 | 351.9 | 15 |
| 3 | Greece | 2,000 | 10,737 | 132 | 15.2 | 81.4 | 5 |
| 4 | Turkey | 8,000 | 76,806 | 785 | 10.2 | 97.8 | 10 |
| 5 | Belgium | 300 | 10,414 | 31 | 9.8 | 341.1 | 35 |
| 6 | France | 5,000 | 64,420 | 549 | 9.1 | 117.3 | 13 |
| | **High-Density Regions (1−27)** | **185,630** | **3,370,474** | **21,200** | **8.8** | **159.0** | **18** |
| 7 | Germany | 3,000 | 82,330 | 357 | 8.4 | 230.5 | 27 |
| 8 | Japan | 3,000 | 127,079 | 378 | 7.9 | 336.2 | 42 |
| 9 | Former Czechoslovakia | 1,000 | 15,675 | 128 | 7.8 | 122.5 | 16 |
| 10 | Spain | 3,750 | 40,525 | 505 | 7.4 | 80.2 | 11 |
| 11 | Switzerland | 300 | 7,604 | 41 | 7.3 | 184.2 | 25 |
| 12 | Albania | 200 | 3,639 | 29 | 7.0 | 126.6 | 18 |
| 13 | China | 59,600 | 1,331,400 | 9,600 | 6.2 | 138.7 | 22 |
| 14 | Austria | 500 | 8,210 | 84 | 6.0 | 97.9 | 16 |
| 15 | Former Yugoslavia | 1,500 | 23,031 | 267 | 5.6 | 86.3 | 15 |
| 16 | Tunisia | 800 | 10,486 | 164 | 4.9 | 64.1 | 13 |
| 17 | Netherlands | 200 | 16,716 | 42 | 4.8 | 402.4 | 84 |
| 18 | Bulgaria | 500 | 7,205 | 111 | 4.5 | 64.9 | 14 |
| 19 | Egypt | 4,500 | 78,867 | 1,001 | 4.5 | 78.8 | 18 |
| 20 | Portugal | 400 | 10,708 | 92 | 4.3 | 116.1 | 27 |
| 21 | Denmark | 180 | 5,501 | 43 | 4.2 | 127.7 | 31 |
| 22 | Romania | 800 | 22,215 | 238 | 3.4 | 93.2 | 28 |
| 23 | Hungary | 300 | 9,906 | 93 | 3.2 | 106.5 | 33 |
| 24 | Ireland & Great Britain | 800 | 65,316 | 314 | 2.5 | 208.1 | 82 |
| 25 | Iraq | 1,000 | 28,946 | 435 | 2.3 | 66.5 | 29 |
| 26 | Iran | 4,000 | 66,429 | 1,745 | 2.3 | 38.1 | 17 |
| 27 | Morocco | 1,000 | 31,285 | 447 | 2.2 | 70.1 | 31 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **World (1−50)** | **225,820** | **6,764,086** | **134,273** | **1.7** | **50.4** | **30** |
| 28 | 54 Asian countries | 15,000 | 998,322 | 10,227 | 1.5 | 97.6 | 67 |
| 29 | East Timor & Indonesia | 2,800 | 231,731 | 1,926 | 1.5 | 120.3 | 83 |
| 30 | Poland | 450 | 38,483 | 313 | 1.4 | 123.1 | 86 |
| 31 | Mexico | 2,200 | 111,212 | 1,964 | 1.1 | 56.6 | 51 |
| 32 | Algeria | 2,000 | 34,178 | 2,382 | 0.8 | 14.4 | 17 |
| 33 | Sudan | 2,000 | 41,088 | 2,488 | 0.8 | 16.5 | 21 |
| 34 | 14 small west European countries | 300 | 2,840 | 529 | 0.6 | 5.4 | 9 |
| 35 | Sweden | 200 | 9,060 | 450 | 0.4 | 20.1 | 45 |
| 36 | Eritrea & Ethiopia | 500 | 90,884 | 1,254 | 0.4 | 72.5 | 182 |
| | **Low-Density Regions (28−50)** | **40,190** | **3,393,612** | **113,073** | **0.4** | **30.0** | **84** |
| 37 | 44 African countries | 5,450 | 596,128 | 17,325 | 0.3 | 34.4 | 109 |
| 38 | Somalia | 200 | 9,832 | 638 | 0.3 | 15.4 | 49 |
| 39 | Norway | 100 | 4,661 | 385 | 0.3 | 12.1 | 47 |
| 40 | Libya | 400 | 6,324 | 1,760 | 0.2 | 3.6 | 16 |
| 41 | 43 Latin American and Caribbean countries | 3,400 | 472,779 | 18,461 | 0.2 | 25.6 | 139 |
| 42 | Former USSR | 3,900 | 283,290 | 22,307 | 0.2 | 12.7 | 73 |
| 43 | South Africa | 100 | 49,052 | 1,219 | 0.1 | 40.2 | 491 |
| 44 | United States | 680 | 307,212 | 9,832 | 0.1 | 31.2 | 452 |
| 45 | Mozambique | 50 | 21,669 | 799 | 0.1 | 27.1 | 433 |
| 46 | Finland | 20 | 5,250 | 338 | 0.1 | 15.5 | 263 |
| 47 | Australia | 360 | 21,263 | 7,741 | 0.0 | 2.7 | 59 |
| 48 | Canada | 80 | 33,487 | 9,880 | 0.0 | 3.4 | 419 |
| 49 | Madagascar | 0 | 20,654 | 587 | 0.0 | 35.2 | ∞ |
| 50 | New Zealand | 0 | 4,213 | 268 | 0.0 | 15.7 | ∞ |

P = population (1000); T = territory (1000 km$^2$); D = density = P / T; Q = growth = $D_{2009}$ / $D_1$

Source: A. Maddison, Historical statistics of the world economy: 1−2008 AD [spreadsheet], online, https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-database-2010 [accessed: 24.02.2022]; The World Bank (24 February 2022); author's own calculations.

## Climate changes the fate of empires

Without any need for contentious speculations about the nature, causes, and future of the present-day global warming, historically it can be shown that the fates of a great number of empires and civilisations in the last 12,000 years were dramatically affected by changes in local and global climates.[12] For example, especially with relevance to the issue of national power, in 2017, Kyle Harper published the book titled *The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease, and the End of an Empire*. This was the first book to look at how climatic change and infectious diseases played a role in the collapse of Rome's power:

> At scales that the Romans themselves could not have understood and scarcely imagined—from the microscopic to the global—the fall of their empire was the triumph of nature over human ambitions. The fate of Rome was played out by emperors and barbarians, senators and generals, soldiers and slaves. But it was equally decided by bacteria and viruses, volcanoes and solar cycles. Only in recent years have we come into possession of the scientific tools that allow us to glimpse, often fleetingly, the grand drama of environmental change in which the Romans were unwitting actors.[13]

Economic data from 166 countries for the years 1960–2010 shows that the optimum for human economic productivity is around 11–15 °C (mean annual temperature), peaking at 13 °C[14] (Burke et al. 2015). Human populations have historically remained concentrated in a narrow subset of the available climatic range, which is not explained by soil fertility or potential primary productivity.[15] Current production of crops and livestock is largely congruent with the human distribution, whereas GDP peaks at somewhat lower temperatures.[16]

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[12] According to the *Encyclopedia Britannica* and other sources, commonly measured meteorological variables of the climate include: solar radiation, temperature, humidity, precipitation (type, frequency, amount), atmospheric pressure, and wind (speed, direction). The widely-used Köppen climate classification system defines five main groups of climate patterns, namely: A (tropical), B (dry), C (temperate), D (continental), and E (polar). Temperature defines four of the groups. Group B is defined through precipitation. Those main groups are further divided into 30 subgroups.

[13] K. Harper, *The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease, and the End of an Empire*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2017, pp. 4–5.

[14] M. Burke, S.M. Hsiang, E. Miguel, Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic production, *Nature* 2015, No. 527, pp. 235–239.

[15] The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) defines primary productivity as "the transformation of chemical or solar energy to biomass. Most primary production occurs through photosynthesis, whereby green plants convert solar energy, carbon dioxide, and water to glucose and eventually to plant tissue. In addition, some bacteria in the deep sea can convert chemical energy to biomass through chemosynthesis" – https://www.eea.europa.eu/help/glossary/chm-biodiversity/primary-productivity [accessed: 24.02.2022].

[16] C. Xu (徐驰), T.A. Kohler, T.M. Lenton, J.-C. Svenning, M. Scheffer, Future of the human climate niche, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 2020, Vol. 117, No. 21, p. 11351.

## Russia as the world's largest wheat exporter[17]

Siberia is a huge northern land mass with around 13.5 million km$^2$. It is thus bigger than any country except the one that it is part of; Siberia makes up about three quarters of the territory of the Russian Federation. The population of the three federal districts that make up Siberia (Ural, Siberia, Far East) is around 37 million (recorded for the year 2022), which represents about a quarter of the Russian population. In the past, the southernmost stretches of Siberia were temperate enough to offer workable soil. The last twenty years brought warming temperatures and longer-growing seasons. For very few places in the world global warming is as positive as for Siberia. Still one of the coldest regions on the planet, global warming and increased precipitation produce opportunity and prosperity in Siberia.


**Figure 1. Russia's wheat production in the period of 1992–2019 gross production value (constant 2014–2016 billion I$)**

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (24 February 2022).

For the longest time, Russia has sought to populate its vast eastern lands. The steady thawing of Siberia's permafrost now opens tens of million of acres of land to a possibly of a flourishing agricultural economy. According to Nadezhda Tchebakova, a leading Russian climate ecologist, more and more of the Siberian land mass is going from "absolute extreme" in its inhospitality to "fairly favourable" for civilisation, and quite hospitable if not pleasantly liveable (Lustgarten 2020). Food is power, although perhaps less so in wealthy countries (though there the *precariat* is growing, too). In 2010, wildfires and drought ruined part of Russia's grain harvests; Putin banned exports of wheat;

[17] Much of the text in this section is a direct condensation of Abrahm Lustgarten's, How Russia wins the climate crisis, *The New York Times Magazine* 2020, December 16 [online], https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/12/16/magazine/russia-climate-migration-crisis.html [accessed: 24.02.2022]. Except for the most general information in the beginning and the graph.

global wheat prices tripled. A shortage in the daily caloric intake from bread exacerbated the Arab Spring uprisings from 2010 to 2012.[18]

The following diagram shows the growth in Russian wheat production from 1992 to 2019 in constant international dollars:

In 2014, the EU and the USA imposed sanctions on the Russian Federation. Russia, in turn, imposed countersanctions on European imports. From 2015 to 2018, Russia's wheat exports jumped 100% to about 44 million tons, surpassing those of the USA and the EU. Russia is now the largest wheat exporter in the world, responsible for nearly a quarter of the global market. In 2019, Putin told attendees of the Russia–Africa Economic Forum: "We are now exporting more agricultural products than weapons".[19]

## Siberia as a geopolitical project and vision

Sergey Karaganov (born in 1952) heads Russia's Council on Foreign and Defence Policy. He has been an adviser to Jelzin and Putin. On 16th February, 2022, he published an article titled "Искусствоведческое эссе о будущем российской политики" in *Global Affairs*.[20] In this article, he writes:

> It would be much more effective to invest in the East, in the development of Siberia. By creating favorable working and living conditions, we will attract not only Russian citizens, but also people from the other parts of the former Russian Empire (…)
>
> Let me reiterate a point from my other articles: It was the incorporation of Siberia under Ivan the Terrible that made Russia a great power (…)[21]

The above reference is to Karaganov's article titled "Идя в Сибирь, мы идем и в будущее, и к истокам нас как державы",[22] published on 27th

[18] According to Michael Werz, "There's a reason people demonstrated with baguettes in Cairo." Werz is a senior fellow for climate migration and security at the Center for American Progress, ibidem.

[19] Ibidem. Since the 1960s, the USSR had been a net grain importer. It had to acquire 47 million tons of grain in 1985, which set a new record for grain imports. The Soviet reliance on imported grain became one of the driving forces behind *perestroika* and economic reforms, and, subsequently, the demise of the USSR. Due to a dramatic reduction in oil prices in the late 1980s, the USSR suffered an ongoing financial crisis – A. Lossan, How Russia became the world's LEADING wheat exporter, *Russia Beyond* 2020, November 3 [online], https://www.rbth.com/business/332948-russia-leading-wheat-exporter [accessed: 24.02.2022].

[20] The article was subsequently translated and published by *Russia Today* under the title "Russia's new foreign policy, the Putin Doctrine".

[21] S. Karaganov, Sergey Karaganov: Russia's new foreign policy, the Putin Doctrine, *Russia Today* 2022, February 23 [online], https://www.rt.com/russia/550271-putin-doctrine-foreign-policy/ [accessed: 24.02.2022].

[22] S. Karaganov, Караганов: Идя в Сибирь, мы идем и в будущее, и к истокам нас как державы [Karaganov: Going to Siberia, we are going to the future, and to the origins of us as a power], *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* 2021, No. 221(8572) [online], https://rg.ru/2021/09/27/reg-

September, 2021, in the *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. Here is a professional translation[23] of the last three paragraphs:

> By turning towards Siberia, we will not just move to the Eastern outskirts of Europe, but into the future and to our origins as a great power. The Mongol hordes that came from Asia not only stunted our development by wars and tribute collection, but they also shaped the boundlessness of Russian geopolitical thinking, brought us religious tolerance and cultural openness. Moreover, in the fight against them, we have established a key element of the Russian cultural code – the quest for independence and sovereignty.
>
> Z. Brzeziński, the eminent American political scientist, was deliberately wrong when he made his famous and oftentimes repeated, even among us, statement that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a great power. That is not the case – Russia would not have become a great power without Siberia, without its resources, without the 'Siberian character', of which Russians see themselves, and it would not have stood up against the conquerors on the European plain without 'Siberian regiments'. In the best case scenario, it would most likely become the Eastern alternative of Poland. I know this sounds offensive to many people.
>
> New research and development centers can and should be built in Siberia, as proposed by S. K. Shoigu and many scientists. However, it is equally important to transfer a significant part of metropolitan functions and most of the federal agencies, perhaps the State Duma and/or the Federation Council to its cities. This would attract, in particular, educated, and ambitious young people to Siberia, who would accelerate the process of geoideological and spiritual maturation of Russia's elite.[24]

sibfo/karaganov-idia-v-sibir-my-idem-i-v-budushchee-i-k-istokam-nas-kak-derzhavy.html [accessed: 24.02.2022].

[23] My thanks to Umeda Gafurova.

[24] S. Karaganov, ibidem.